We study the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a public procurement auction. In our model, …rms are invited to the auction at positive costs, and a bureaucrat who runs the auction on behalf of a government may request a bribe from the winning …rm. We …rst present the over-invitation results in the absence of corruption, in which more than a socially optimal number of …rms will be invited. Second, we show that the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium outcomes vary across di¤erent forms of bribery. For a …xed bribe, corruption has no e¤ect on equilibrium competition, although it does induce social welfare loss.
Introduction
Public procurements account for a substantial part of economies worldwide. In the European Union (EU), for example, more than 250,000 public authorities spend approximately 14% of GDP on the purchase of services and supplies each year. 1 Corruption is a common concern in this context. To prevent corruption, most countries implement laws and regulations to guarantee necessary competition and transparency in public procurements. For instance, the EU requires a minimum of 52 days for a public contract notice in an open procedure, for which any business can submit a tender, and in a restricted procedure, for which only thoese who are pre-selected are invited to submit a tender, a public authority must invite at least …ve bidders to the competition process. 2 The belief underlying these rules is that competition may help improve e¢ ciency and reduce corruption. Surprisingly, the existing literature has paid insu¢ cient attention to the intrinsic link between corruption and competition in public procurements. In this paper, we will investigate this important issue in a model of a procurement auction. Speci…cally, in our model, there are three parties: a government, such as the Department of Defense; a bureaucrat who runs the procurement auction on behalf of the government; and a number of potential …rms (bidders) who can bid for the public contract if invited. Firms are invited to the auction at a positive invitation cost, and the bureaucrat may request a bribe from the winning …rm of the auction. 3 We investigate the common practice of …rst-price procurement auctions. In a standard …rst-price procurement auction, the …rm with the lowest cost wins, and the price received is equal to its bid. Without corruption, the bureaucrat's objective is in line with that of the government, which is related to the price paid to the winning …rm. The social welfare, however, is related to the actual production cost of the winning …rm; thus, we do not model the government as a social planner in this paper.
Under the standard assumption for procurement auctions that …rms'cost distribution is of decreasing reversed hazard rate (DRHR) and that there is a positive invitation cost, we show that in equilibrium, the bureaucrat will invite more …rms than the socially optimum to bid for the public contract. In other words, the optimal number of …rms that maximizes the government's payo¤ is larger than the e¢ cient number of …rms that maximizes social welfare. This over-invitation result is not as surprising as it …rst looks, as the government is modeled as a government division in our model; it cares about its own procurement payo¤ rather than the overall social welfare. The intuition is that inviting an extra …rm reduces the expected total surplus of the …rms, which is ignored by the payo¤-maximizing government but is taken into account in the total social welfare.
We then introduce corruption into the procurement auction, in which the bureaucrat may request a bribe from the winning …rm. In public procurements, corruption takes many forms. In our study, we consider two speci…cations of bribery. The …rst is a …xed bribe in which the bureaucrat requests the winning …rm to pay a …xed amount as a bribe. For instance, the …xed bribe can be in the form of a commission fee or a kickback that occurs in the real world (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012) . The second is a proportional bribe, whereby the winning …rm must share a proportion of its revenue with the corrupt bureaucrat. For example, in Indonesia, the former president Suharto was publicly known as "Mr. Twenty-Five Percent" because he required that all major contracts throughout the nation give him 25 percent of the income. 4 We assume that the bureaucrat cares about a weighted average of his individual bribe and the government payo¤. Our main result is that the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare vary across di¤erent forms of bribery. When the bribe is a …xed amount, the corrupt bureaucrat invites the same number of …rms as in the absence of corruption, as his incentive to invite …rms remains the same as before. That is, corruption in the form of a …xed bribe has no e¤ect on equilibrium competition. However, it does change social welfare and resource allocation in equilibrium. Under the expectation of paying the …xed bribe upon winning, all …rms will mark up their bids by the same amount of bribe, which increases the expected payment of the government to the winning …rm. As a result, the …xed bribe is actually paid by the government, and it will not hurt the …rms at all. Meanwhile, increased public expenditure by the government implies social welfare loss due to the marginal cost of distortion of public funds.
By contrast, under a proportional bribe, the corrupt bureaucrat may invite either fewer or more …rms to the auction than before, depending on how much the bureaucrat weights his personal interest relative to the government payo¤. There are two opposite e¤ects here on the equilibrium competition. On the one hand, the proportional bribe will increase …rms' bids proportionally, therefore making the distribution of bids more dispersed. It decreases competition in the auction, and, in response to it, the bureaucrat needs to encourage competition. On the other hand, the bureaucrat also has an incentive to discourage competition, as the winning …rm's revenue is decreasing in competition in the auction, and the bribe he receives is a proportion of it. Therefore, the relative magnitude between these two opposite e¤ects determines the equilibrium level of competition. A seemly surprising result is that corruption in the form of a proportional bribe may induce Pareto-improving allocation in equilibrium.
We also consider the format of second-price procurement auctions and show that the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still holds in our settings. Speci…cally, under the …xed bribe, …rms will mark up their bids by the same amount of bribe, and under the proportional bribe, …rms will correspondingly raise their bids proportionally. In the end, the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare are the same in both …rst-and second-price procurement auctions. We further investigate the e¤ects of information disclosure on auction outcomes. When …rms'areas of specialization are di¤erentiated, revealing project information may induce more dispersed distribution of …rms'cost estimates. A piece of project information may drive up the cost estimates of some …rms, if they …nd it is a mismatch to their areas of specialization, while driving down those of others that …nd it to be a good match. As a result, …rms'cost estimates become more dispersed under information disclosure. We show that information disclosure increases both the e¢ cient and optimal number of …rms in procurement auctions. The intuition is that under information disclosure, …rms'cost estimates become more dispersed, and the auction becomes less competitive than before. It is then better to invite more …rms to the auction, either to maximize government payo¤ or social welfare. This result continues to hold in the case of corruption.
Finally, we also provide brief discussions on the policy implications of our results. For the regulation of public procurement, we show that imposing a requirement on the minimum number of bidders may be e¤ective only when it lies in a reasonable range. For instance, if it is too low, it will not impose real restrictions on a corrupt bureaucrat's choice; if it is too high, it may instead incur social welfare loss in equilibrium.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the …rst to examine the e¤ects of various forms of corruption on equilibrium outcomes in procurement auctions with a variable number of …rms. In the literature, most papers focus on how a bureaucrat manipulates the auction rules in exchange for bribes while the number of …rms is …xed. For example, Compte et al. (2005) and Menezes and Monteiro (2006) consider a corruption model in which the bureaucrat may o¤er a favored …rm an opportunity to readjust its initial bid in exchange for a bribe. This arrangement is known as right of …rst refusal, and other related papers include Burguet and Perry (2009) and Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) . Another strand in the literature studies corruption in multidimensional procurement auctions, whereby the government may care about both the price and quality of the project. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) and Burguet and Che (2004) examine corruption in which the bureaucrat manipulates the quality assessment to favor the …rms o¤ering higher bribes.
Regarding the link between competition and corruption, the general idea is that increasing competition may reduce corruption (Svensson, 2005) , and Ades and Di Tella (1999) provide some supportive empirical evidence showing that corruption is higher in countries where foreign competition is restricted. However, several theoretical studies show that a simple relationship may not hold generally. Bliss and Di Tella (1997) pro-pose a model in which both the equilibrium number of …rms and the level of corruption are endogenously determined by other parameters, and the negative relationship between competition and corruption does not always hold. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) also …nd that with an increasing number of …rms, there may be a higher level of corruption. In this paper, we also show that the relationship between corruption and competition depends on the particular form of bribery.
Our paper is also related to the literature on auctions with costly entry. McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994) examine the entry process in which potential bidders must pay a …xed entry cost. Szech (2011) and Fang and Li (2015) consider the other case in which the auctioneer incurs costs to invite potential bidders, and they show the over-invitation result in ascending auctions when bidders'valuation distribution is of increasing failure rate. We follow the similar setting of positive invitation cost, albeit in the case of descending procurement auction, and derive the over-invitation results under the di¤erent DRHR assumption. Our primary focus in on the link between corruption and the equilibrium competition and social welfare in procurement auctions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the benchmark model of procurement auction where there is no corruption. Section 3 studies the equilibrium outcomes under corruption, and there are two cases, the …xed bribe and proportional bribe. Section 4 provides some further discussions, and Section 5 presents our concluding remarks.
Benchmark: without corruption
Consider a public procurement auction in which a government plans to allocate a contract, and a bureaucrat runs the auction on behalf of the government. We assume there are an in…nite number of potential …rms quali…ed for this contract, and n …rms are invited to the auction at a cost of C(n), which is paid by the government. The value of the contract to the government is V . The cost function C(n) is increasing and weakly convex, that is, C 0 (n) > 0 and C 00 (n) 0. The …rms are ex ante homogenous whose production cost X conforms to the distribution of F ( ) on [0; V ], with strictly positive density f ( ). Assume all players are risk-neutral. For those invited …rms, i = 1; 2; :::; n, let fX i g n i=1 be n independent draws from the same distribution F ( ), where X i is the production cost for …rm i. The distribution of F ( ) is common knowledge, and the realization of X i is only observed by …rm i. We denote X k:n be the kth lowest cost of the n invited …rms, and we have
For an order statistic X k:n , let F k:n ( ) and f k:n ( ) be its cumulative distribution function and probability density function, respectively. As commonly practiced, we assume that the procurement runs in the format of a sealed-bid …rst-price auction. It is well known that the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy in a …rst-price procurement auction is given by (e.g., Krishna, 2002, p.17) ,
where F 1:n 1 (x) = 1 F 1:n 1 (x) is the survival function.
In the auction, the …rm with the lowest cost X 1:n wins, and its revenue is equal to the bid b(X 1:n ). 5 The rent for the winning …rm is thus
The government's payo¤ is equal to the net project bene…t, V b(X 1:n ), minus the invitation cost, C(n), which is
In this benchmark case of no corruption, we assume the bureaucrat's objective is in line with that of the government, and he does not gain personal bene…t.
It is worth noting that we do not model the government as a social planner. Instead, we model it as a government agency that cares about its own payo¤ rather than overall social welfare. For example, the Department of Defense in the U.S. procures weapons systems, and its primary concerns are the budget spending and the performance of the weapons system procured.
Government spending, including payment to the winning …rm, b(X 1:n ), and the expenditure on invitation cost, C(n), uses public funds that are …nanced through taxation. We assume that there is a marginal cost of public funds, which is 2 [0; 1), due to the distortion of resource allocation caused by taxation (La¤ont and Tirole, 1987) . Social welfare is then measured by the sum of the rents of …rms (1) and the payo¤ of the government (2), less the distortion cost of public funds, which is
As the auction organizer, the bureaucrat decides how many …rms are invited. When there is no corruption, his objective is to select the optimal number of …rms to maximize the expected government payo¤, E[ (n)]. We are also interested in the e¢ cient number of …rms that maximizes the expected social welfare, E[W (n)]. Next, we will show that the 5 The case of tying is ignored since the distribution of …rms'production costs is continuous. optimization problems of E[ (n)] and E[W (n)] are well de…ned under speci…c standard assumptions, and these results are determined by the properties of E[X 1:n ] and E[X 2:n ]. We provide several results in the following paragraphs.
Lemma 1
The expected payment of the government is equal to the expected second-lowest production cost, that is,
This result is implied by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
Lemma 2 E[X 1:n ] is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in n, and lim n!1 E[X 1:n ] = 0.
Proof: In the Appendix. The monotonicity property is straightforward as X 1:n is the smallest order statistic, and as the number of …rms invited into the auction increases, E[X 1:n ] will naturally decrease and converge to zero. The convexity result is implied by the continuity of the distribution F ( ). The property of the second-order statistic, E[X 2:n ], is more challenging to interpret. We will next show that as the distribution of X satis…es the property of decreasing reversed hazard rate, then E[X 2:n ] is strictly convex in n.
De…nition 1
The distribution of X is said to be of decreasing reversed hazard rate (DRHR) if its reversed hazard rate
is decreasing in x.
The DRHR assumption on X in the procurement auction is analogous to the regularity condition of increasing failure rate in the standard ascending price auction (Myerson, 1981) . The di¤erence is that in a procurement auction, the bidder o¤ering the lowest bid wins the auction, whereas in a standard ascending price auction the bidder o¤ering the highest bid wins.
There are many examples of DRHR distributions, such as uniform, normal and exponential distributions. Furthermore, a positive random variable cannot have increasing reversed hazard rate, because f (x)=F (x) will converge to in…nity when x approaches zero. Therefore, in our case of positive production cost, it is not possible for X to be of increasing reversed hazard rate.
The following result shows that when the distribution of X is of DRHR, E[X 2:n ] is strictly convex in n.
Lemma 3 If the distribution of X is of DRHR, then
(i) E[X 2:n ] is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in n.
(ii) Moreover, lim n!1 E[X 2:n X 2:n+1 ] = 0:
Proof: In the Appendix. The result that E[X 2:n ] is strictly decreasing in n does not depend on the condition of DRHR. In fact, DRHR is a su¢ cient yet unnecessary condition for the convexity result, and a weaker su¢ cient condition is that
is increasing in x, which is implied by DRHR.
In addition, we are also interested in how the expected rent of the winning …rm changes with n. From Lemma 1, it is the expectation di¤erence of the …rst-and secondorder statistic. We have the following result.
Lemma 4 If the distribution of X is of DRHR, then the expected rent of the winning …rm,
(i) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in n.
Proof: In the Appendix. The intuition underlying this result is that increasing competition will gradually squeeze out the expected rent of the winning …rm. Furthermore, the expected rent converges to zero when the number of …rms approaches in…nity. A direct implication of Lemma 4 is that
that is, for given n, if one more …rm is invited into the auction, then the expected value of E[X 2:n ] drops faster than E[X 1:n ]. Our Lemma 2-4 are analogous to Lemma 1-4 in Szech (2011), who studied secondprice ascending auctions. In this paper, however, we examine the procurement auction in the format of …rst-price descending auctions. Based on our discussions above, we know that max E[ (n)] and max E[W (n)] are both well de…ned concave maximization problems under the assumption of DRHR. Denote n to be the optimal number of …rms that maximizes the government's expected payo¤, and n to be the e¢ cient number of …rms that maximizes the expected social welfare, respectively. By de…nition, we have
Here, the number of …rms is discrete, and n and n may not be unique.
The main result of this section is the comparison between the optimal and e¢ cient number of …rms in the procurement auction without corruption, which gives us the following result.
Proposition 1 If the distribution of X is of DRHR, then we have
Proof: In the Appendix. The proposition states that when the distribution of …rms'cost estimates is of DRHR, the bureaucrat, with the aim of maximizing the expected payo¤ for the government, will invite more …rms into the procurement auction than the social optimum. In other words, over-invitation of …rms occurs in the benchmark case of no corruption.
The over-invitation result is not surprising at …rst glance, and it is implied by the inequality function of (4). For one more …rm entering the auction, the marginal change in the expected government payo¤ is E[ (n)] = E[X 2:n X 2:n+1 ] (C(n + 1) C(n)), and the marginal change of the expected social welfare can be normalized as
The inequality function (4) implies that for any given n, E[ (n)] is larger than
E[W (n + 1)], we obtain the over-invitation result (6) . Basically, it is based on the fact that the marginal change of the expected government payo¤ is larger than the normalized marginal change of social welfare. Thus, the expected government payo¤ approaches the maximum more slowly than the expected social welfare does.
To gain a deeper understanding of the results obtained above, we provide a simple numerical example where X conforms to a uniform distribution.
, which is obviously of DRHR. If there are n …rms in the auction, then
And both E[X 1:n ] and E[X 2:n ] are strictly decreasing and convex in n, as shown in Lemma 2 and 3. Assume C(n) = nc, where c is constant.
The expected rent of the winning …rm is
which is strictly decreasing and convex in n, and lim n!1 E[R(n)] = 0, as shown in Lemma 4.
The optimal decision problem for the bureaucrat is thus
and the optimal condition for n is
We next solve the following problem for the socially e¢ cient number of …rms:
The optimal condition for n is thus
Apparently, n n , as
1+2 1+
2. For example, if = 0:2, c = 2 and V = 36, then we have n = 5 and n = 4. This result con…rms the result (6) in Proposition 1.
Corruption in Procurement Auctions
We next introduce corruption into the public procurement auction. As Jain (2001) states, corruption is an act in which the power of public o¢ ce is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game. Various types of corruption are identi…ed in the real world. In this paper, we consider the case whereby the bureaucrat in charge of the procurement can request a bribe of B(n) from the winning …rm. We assume that the invited …rms are fully aware of the request and that they accept this tacit rule prior to the auction. As only the winner pays the bribe, our setting rules out sunk investments for the …rms as lobbying activities, as in all pay auctions or other standard rent-seeking models.
In particular, we consider two forms of bribery: a …xed bribe amount, B(n) = B, and a proportional bribe, B(n) = b(X 1:n ), 2 [0; 1]. In the …rst case, the …xed bribe amount is speci…ed by the bureaucrat, and all the …rms know this condition before o¤ering their bids. In the second case, the fraction is exogenously given, and the kickback is just a proportion of the winning bid. These two forms of bribery are relatively pervasive in the real practice of public procurements, such as commissions and kickbacks paid to agencies. 6 We assume that the bureaucrat cares about not only his individual bribe B(n) but also the government payo¤, (n). Speci…cally, the bureaucrat's objective function is a weighted average of these two terms, as follows:
where 2 [0; 1] is the weight for government payo¤.
We do not consider a penalty for corruption in our model, although it could be introduced in a straightforward way, for example, a detecting probability that is decreasing in and a penalty that is proportional to B(n). Our focus here is on the relationship between corruption and equilibrium competition in the procurement auction. The introduction of a penalty will at most temper but will not change the direction of the results; therefore, we avoid that complication in our model.
Fixed bribe
In the case of …xed bribe, the bureaucrat requests the winning …rm to pay a …xed bribe of B after the auction. As mentioned above, we assume that …rms are fully aware of the request prior to the auction, and accept it as a tacit rule. The …xed amount of bribe B therefore appears to be a part of the cost, conditional on winning the auction. Let subscript 'F 'denote …xed bribe. The virtual cost for …rm i is now X 0 i = X i +B, conditional on winning. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is b F (X i ) = b(X 0 i ), which satis…es the following property:
Lemma 5 The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy in a …rst-price procurement auction, with a …xed bribe of B, is given by
That is, all …rms will increase the bid by the amount of the bribe.
Proof: In the Appendix. As a result, the lowest cost …rm wins with a bid of b(X 1:n ) + B, and the payment it receives is the same as the bid. Thus, the rent for the winning …rm remains the same as in equation (1), which is
However, under the …xed bribe, the government needs to pay the amount of B more than before in equation (2), and its payo¤ is now
The social welfare is equal to the sum of the rent of the winning …rm (7), the government's payo¤ (8) , and the …xed bribe for the bureaucrat B, and then minus the distortion cost of public funds (B + b(X 1:n ) + C(n)). Thus, the total social welfare is
Compared with equation (3), the social welfare in the case of no corruption, we …nd that
One potential issue is that the payo¤ for the government might be negative. If we think of V as the government's willingness to pay, then V can also be interpreted as the maximum budget for the contract. The case of negative government's payo¤ then can be explained as a case of a project budget de…cit, which is relatively pervasive in public procurement. See Ganuza (2007) for more discussions on the cost overruns in procurements. Here, we allow the possibility of negative F (n) in our model. 7 The corrupt bureaucrat's optimization problem is
Apparently, when the distribution of X is of DRHR, E[ F (n)] is strictly increasing and concave in n. The optimization conditions for equation (10) are thus
which are equivalent to the optimization conditions in the case of no corruption. If we denote the optimal number of …rms in this case of …xed bribe as n F , then the following result is obvious.
Proposition 2 If the distribution of X is of DRHR, then under a …xed bribe, a corrupt bureaucrat will invite the same number of …rms into the procurement auction, as in the case of no corruption. That is,
However, the …xed bribe incurs a social welfare loss of B.
The result indicates that bribery in the form of a …xed bribe has no e¤ect on equilibrium competition. The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. As the bribe is …xed at a given level, the bureaucrat's objective remains the same as in the benchmark case of no corruption, which is to maximize the expected government payo¤. Therefore, the …xed bribe will not change the incentive for the corrupt bureaucrat to invite the …rms. However, it changes resource allocation and the social welfare in equilibrium. As all the …rms mark up their bid by the …xed amount of bribe B, the bribe is actually paid by the government and will not hurt the …rms. Furthermore, as the government expenditure increases by B in this case, the distortion cost of public funds implies that the amount of social welfare loss is B. In other words, we then have W F (n F ) W (n ) = B from equations (3), (9) and (11) .
In this case, of a …xed bribe, as mentioned before, the expected government payo¤ could be negative. We interpret this case as a project budget de…cit for the government. Alternatively, if we impose the ex ante participation constraint for the government, the bureaucrat's decision is subject to the constraint that E[ F (n)] 0. In this case, the value of the …xed bribe B is determined endogenously. However, the result will remain the same as in Proposition 2. For instance, let
, and thus, we also have n F = n .
Proportional bribe
We next consider the case of proportional bribe, and assume that the winning …rm needs to pay a proportion of 2 [0; 1] of its winning bid to the corrupt bureaucrat. The intuition implies that …rms will exaggerate their bids, and the following result shows that the ratio of exaggeration is 1 1 . Let us …rst derive the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies for …rms.
Lemma 6
The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy in a …rst-price procurement auction, with a proportion bribe, is given by
That is, all …rms will increase the bid by the ratio of Under the proportional bribe, the rent for the winning …rm is
where the subscript 'P ' denotes the case of proportional bribe. It is obvious that the government's payo¤ function is no longer the same as in equation (2), and it is now
The corrupt bureaucrat receives the bribe B(n) = b P (X 1:n ). As before, the total social welfare is the sum of the payo¤s of the three parties, minus the distortion cost of public funds, which is
The corrupt bureaucrat's payo¤ function is a weighted average of his bribe and the government's payo¤, and his problem is thus
Note that the concavity of E[U P (n)] is not guaranteed naturally in this case. Under the DRHR assumption, we know that E[ P (n)] is concave, and E[b P (X 1:n )] is convex in n, and therefore the convex combination of them is not necessarily concave. Simple transformation follows another expression of E[U P (n)] as
From Lemma 3, we know E[X 2:n ] is strictly decreasing and convex in n, and thus E[U P (n)] is strictly concave if (1 ) > 0.
Lemma 7
If the distribution of X is of DRHR and < 1 , then E[U P (n)] is strictly concave in n.
In practice, the condition of < 1 should readily be satis…ed in the case of public procurement. Given the magnitude of public procurement, usually tens of millions USD, we could reasonably think that the bribe amount is small relative to the winning bid. In fact, it is trivial if 1 , the bureaucrat's objective function, E[U P (n)], is strictly decreasing in n, and then the optimal number of …rms, denoted by n P , is equal to 1, i.e., the single bid scenario. Here, we focus on the condition of 0 < < 1 , and the following result holds.
Proposition 3
If the distribution of X is of DRHR and 0 < < 1 , then under a proportional bribe, a corrupt bureaucrat invites either fewer or more …rms into the procurement auction than in the benchmark case of no corruption. Speci…cally,
Proof: In the Appendix. The optimal number of …rms under a proportional bribe can be either larger or smaller than the competition without corruption, which depends on the relative magnitude of two opposite e¤ects: i) the …rst term of equation (12), E[ P (n)], implies that he may encourage competition, as …rms raise their bids and therefore the distribution of bids turns out to be more dispersed than before, which decreases the level of competition in the auction; ii) the second term of equation (12) implies that the bureaucrat may discourage competition, as E[b P (X 1:n )] is decreasing in n. Thus, the e¤ect of the proportional bribe on the competition depends on how much the bureaucrat weights his individual interest relative to the government payo¤. As a result, when the corrupt bureaucrat cares more about his personal interest, < 1=2, he will dampen competition in the auction, and when he cares more about the government payo¤, > 1=2, he will encourage competition.
Finally, let us turn to the socially e¢ cient number of …rms in di¤erent cases. If we denote the socially optimal number of …rms in the case of …xed and proportional bribe by n F and n P respectively, then we have following result.
Proposition 4
The order of socially e¢ cient numbers of …rms is n = n F < n P :
Proof: In the Appendix.
This result suggests that the e¤ects of bribery on e¢ cient competition vary on the formats of bribery. Although the …xed bribe does not change the socially e¢ cient competition, the bribery incurs some social cost. Speci…cally, we have
from equations (3) and (9) . Under proportional bribery, …rms exaggerate their bids and the distribution of the winning bids becomes more dispersed, which implies a larger number of …rms for social e¢ ciency.
Let us extend the previous numerical example to the case of corruption, which helps us to understand the various e¤ects of corruption.
Example 2 As we assume X U [0; V ], we have already known that
In the case of a …xed bribe, we have
The optimal number of …rms is apparently n F = n as shown in Proposition 2.
In the case of a proportional bribe, we have
is strictly decreasing in n, so n P = 1, that is the minimum possible number of …rms. It is clear that = 0 is a special case for the single bid result.
Let us consider 0 < < 1 , then E[U P (n)] is concave in n. The optimal condition for n P is
First, if 1=2, we have = 2=3, we have the optimal number of …rms under the proportional bribe, n P = 4, which is less than n = 5.
Second, if
1=2, we have
1, and then n P n . For example, if c = 2 and V = 36, and then n = 5. Now we select = 2=3 and = 2=5 such that
= 4=3, we have the optimal number of …rms under the proportional bribe, n P = 6, which is greater than 5.
Further discussion

Second-price procurement auctions
It is a natural question whether corruption has di¤erent e¤ects on competition in the second-price procurement auction. As we know, bidding the true production cost X i is a weakly dominant strategy in the second-price auction. In the benchmark case of no corruption, it is easy to show that the result of Proposition 1 holds in the second-price scenario. We now consider the results as corruption exists.
In the case of …xed bribe, the bureaucrat requests the winning …rm to pay a …xed bribe of B after the auction, and then the …xed bribe amount appears to be a part of …rms' cost condinional on winning the auction. As the virtual cost for …rm i is now
is thus a weakly dominant strategy for …rm i, and all …rms will mark up their bids by the …xed amount of B. Therefore, the …xed bribe has the same e¤ect on the bidding function from Lemma 5, and we can derive the same result of Proposition 2 in the second-price setting.
Considering the case of a proportional bribe, we assume that the winning …rm needs to pay a proportion of of its revenue to the corrupt bureaucrat. We have the following result:
Lemma 8 If the winning …rm needs to pay a proportion of of its revenue to the corrupt bureaucrat in the second-price procurement auction, bidding 1 1 times the production cost is a weakly dominant strategy.
Recalling Lemma 6, it is obvious that the results of a proportional bribe all remain the same in the second-price setting. In sum, the Revenue Equivalence result between the …rst-and second-price auctions still holds as corruption exists.
Information disclosure
As shown in the recent literature (e.g., Johnson and Myatt, 2006; Ganuza and Panelva, 2010; Jewitt and Li, 2015), information disclosure may induce more dispersed distribution of consumers'valuations. 8 The intuition is that when consumers'preferences are di¤er-entiated, revealing product information may drive up the valuations of some consumers, while driving down those of others; therefore, the distribution of posterior valuations becomes more dispersed. A similar story can be applied here in our procurement context. For example, the …rms may have di¤erent expertise or areas of specialization, and revealing information on the details of the public contract may have di¤erentiated impacts on their cost estimates. That information may be good news for some …rms when they …nd it is a good match for their areas of specialization, whereas it may be bad news for others. Consequently, the distribution of …rms'cost estimates becomes more dispersed under information disclosure. Let us denote Y as the new cost for the …rms after information disclosure, and the corresponding distribution is G( ). Compared with the initial cost of X with distribution F ( ), we know the distribution of Y is more dispersed, or formally, X disp Y , de…ned as follows:
De…nition 2 The random variable X is smaller than Y in the dispersive order, denoted by X disp Y , if
In Proposition 2 of Szech (2011), both the revenue-maximizer and the welfare-maximizer in advertising auctions attract more bidders for the more dispersed distribution of the bidders' valuations. The similar results hold in our settings. Moreover, we show that these results also hold when corruption exists. In summary, for the purpose of either welfare or payo¤ maximization, when the distribution of …rms'costs become more dispersed under information disclosure, more …rms need to be invited for the competition in the public procurement, whether it is with corruption or not, or whether the corruption is in the form of …xed bribe or proportional bribe.
Proposition 5
If X disp Y , and the distribution of F ( ) and G( ) are DRHR, then we have n n ; n n ;
n P n P ; n P n P :
Where n and n denote the optimal number of …rms and socially e¢ cient number of …rms under the distribution F ( ), whilen andn denote the optimal number of …rms and socially e¢ cient number of …rms under the distribution G( ), respectively. The subscripts 'F'and 'P'denote the cases of …xed bribe and proportional bribe.
Proof: In the Appendix. The intuition, as mentioned above, is that more dispersed cost distribution implies that …rms are becoming more heterogeneous; thus, for a given number of …rms, auctions are becoming less competitive than before. As a result, more …rms need to be invited to increase competition in an auction.
Our discussion on the information disclosure raises the concern that a corrupt bureaucrat can disguise his corruption through information disclosure, which enables him to manipulate the dispersion of …rms'cost distribution. For example, if the ex ante distribution of …rms'cost is F ( ), the optimal number of …rms without corruption is n and the optimal number of …rms with a proportional bribe is n P . Let us consider the case of n P < n . If the bureaucrat controls information disclosure, then he can manipulate the cost distribution into G( ), which is more dispersed than F ( ). In this case, he can request the bribery and choosen P , which is larger than n P and possibly closer to n . That information manipulation can be conducted privately such that the government may still believe that the underlying distribution is F ( ), which makes the detection of the bureaucrat's misconduct more di¢ cult.
Government regulations
The above results show that the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare vary across di¤erent forms of bribery. They also raise the question of optimal and e¤ective regulations by a central government to ensure sound public services and improve social welfare. In the case of a …xed bribe, although it will not a¤ect the equilibrium competition, it does incur more public spending by the government, which induces social welfare loss. To prevent corruption in that form, the central government needs to conduct a strict audit of the project budget, guarantee su¢ cient transparency over the entire competition process, and carefully evaluate the claimed costs by …rms.
In the case of a proportional bribe, the corrupt bureaucrat favors less or more competition to share higher revenue with the winning …rm. The actual impact depends on how much the bureaucrat weights his individual interest. Thus, it may be not e¢ cient for the government to impose some requirements on the minimum number of …rms in public procurements. However, if we believe that a corrupt bureaucrat cares more about his personal interest than the government payo¤, say < 1=2 in Proposition 3, then he will have an incentive to dampen competition in the auction. In this case, it would be helpful for the central government or legal authorities to impose requirements on the minimum number of …rms in public procurement. For example, in the rules and procedures for public procurement in the European Union, a public authority must invite at least …ve candidates possessing the capabilities required to submit tenders in the restricted procedure. 9 
Concluding remarks
The link between corruption and competition is an important issue in public procurements, but it receives insu¢ cient attention in the existing literature. In this paper, we studied the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a model of a …rst-price procurement auction. In our model, a bureaucrat runs the auction on behalf of the government, and …rms are invited to the auction, which is costly for the government. The bureaucrat may request a bribe from the winning …rm, which can either be in the form of a …xed bribe or of a proportional bribe.
First, in the benchmark case of no corruption, whereby the bureaucrat's objective is in line with that of the government, we show the over-invitation result. That is, the optimal number of …rms that maximizes the expected government payo¤ is larger than the e¢ cient number of …rms that maximizes social welfare. This result lies in the fact that the government is not modeled as a social planner in our model, and it cares about its own payo¤ rather than the overall social welfare.
Second, for a corrupt bureaucrat, we show that the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare vary across di¤erent forms of bribery. Speci…cally, in the case of a …xed bribe, corruption has no e¤ect on equilibrium competition, as the bribe is …xed and it will not change the bureaucrat's incentive to invite …rms. However, it does induce social welfare loss and di¤erent resource allocations in equilibrium. This is because, in expectation of the …xed bribe, all …rms will mark-up their bids by the same amount of bribe. As a result, it is the government that actually pays the …xed bribe, and higher government spending implies social welfare loss due to the distortion cost of public funds.
In the case of a proportional bribe, corruption will induce either less or more competition in equilibrium. It depends on the weight a bureaucrat gives to his personal interest relative to the government payo¤.
The results of our model shed light on public procurement regulations. First, we show that di¤erent forms of corruption have markedly di¤erent implications on competition and welfare outcomes in procurement auctions. Accordingly, a regulator needs to carefully consider the di¤erent regulation rules that target di¤erent forms of corruption. Meanwhile, we show that it would be easier for a corrupt bureaucrat to disguise his misconduct if he could manipulate the information released to …rms. Therefore, when designing the rules on information disclosure, the regulator needs to conduct a close investigation on the pros and cons of the e¤ects of information disclosure.
Furthermore, this paper also develops a simple and clear framework for analyzing relevant issues in procurement auctions where the number of …rms is variable. This approach is di¤erent from most work in the existing literature whereby the number of …rms is …xed and the focus is on how a bureaucrat manipulates the auction rules in exchange for a bribe. We believe this framework can be readily extended to many other relevant problems, such as corruption in scoring auctions.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof: It holds that
and it implies
n ] is strictly increasing in n. Thus we have E[X 1:n ] is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in n.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof: We …rst have
where F (x) = 1 F (x) is the survival function. It follows that
If the distribution F ( ) is DRHR, we see that the function h(x) =
is increasing. Thus, E[X 2:n ] is strictly decreasing and convex in n. Furthermore, as lim x!0 h(x) = 0, we have lim n!1 E[X 2:n X 2:n+1 ] = 0 from the above lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4:
, it is increasing under the DRHR assumption, and lim x!0 h(x) = 0. Following the same proof as in Lemma 3, we obtain the results.
Proof of Proposition 1:
From n = arg max E[ (n)], the optimization condition implies
which is equivalent to
and
Similarly, for n = arg max E[W (n)], we have
As for all n,
thus, the result of n n is obvious.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Proof: Denote the new increasing bidding strategy in a symmetric equilibrium by b F (x), and bidders i = 2; ; n stick to this strategy. Denote Y = min fX 2 ; ; X n g = X 1:n 1 , and then b F (Y ) is the lowest bid of those bidders. Bidder 1 wins the auction whenever his bid < b F (Y ) bidder, and he chooses the bid to maximize his expected payo¤ Proof of Lemma 6:
Proof: Denote the new increasing bidding strategy in a symmetric equilibrium by b P (x), and bidders i = 2; ; n stick to this strategy. Denote Y = min fX 2 ; ; X n g = X 1:n 1 , and then b P (Y ) is the lowest bid of those bidders. Bidder 1 wins the auction whenever his bid < b P (Y ) bidder, and he chooses bid to maximize his expected payo¤
Taking the …rst-order condition with respect to , it follows that Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof: If 0 < < 1 , Lemma 7 implies E[U P (n)] is strictly concave in n. Then, the optimization conditions for n P are
(1 ) 1 E[X 2:n 1 X 2:n ] (C(n) C(n 1)) and (1 ) 1 E[X 2:n X 2:n+1 ] < (C(n + 1) C(n)):
Compared with the optimization conditions for n , we imply that, If
, i.e., 1=2, then we have n P n . If > , i.e., > 1=2, we have n P > n .
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof: Apparently, n F = n , in which both follow the same optimization conditions Thus, we have n P > n .
Proof of Lemma 8:
Proof: Let us denote the increasing bidding function by b P (x) for a …rm with cost x. Given other …rms that follow this strategy, we derive the equilibrium for …rm 1. Denote Y = minfX 2 ; ; X n g, and then b P (Y ) is the lowest bid of those n 1 rival bidders. Bidder 1 wins the auction whenever his bid < b P (Y ). The objective function is
It is clear that = where the inequality is implied by the result that E[X j:n X j 1:n ] E[Y j:n Y j 1:n ]. Thus, we can conclude that n n . Similarly, we can also prove the result that n n . From Proposition 2, it is clear that n F = n andn F =n , and then n F n F . From Proposition 4, we have n F n F . Now let us prove that n P n P . First, if n P is the corner solution that n P = 1, then n P n P is clearly true asn P 1. Second, if n P is an interior solution such that the optimization conditions for n P are Thus, we can conclude that n P n P . Similar results n P n P can be implied from the optimization conditions as in the Proof of Proposition 4.
